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Abstract. In this paper, we offer a formal approach to the scantily
investigated problem of vague expressions with indexicals, in particular
including the spatial indexical ‘here’ and the temporal indexical ‘now’.
We present two versions of an adaptive fuzzy logic extended with an
indexical, formally expressed by a modifier as a function that applies
to predicative formulas. In the first version, such an operator is applied
to non-vague predicates. The modified formulas may have a fuzzy truth
value and fit into a Sorites paradox. We use adaptive fuzzy logics as a
reasoning tool to address such a paradox. The modifier enables us to
offer an adequate explication of the dynamic reasoning process. In the
second version, a different result is obtained for an indexical applied to
a formula with a possibly vague predicate, where the resulting modified
formula has a crisp value and does not add up to a Sorites paradox.
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1 Introduction
Vagueness and indexicality are both thoroughly studied phenomena of natural
language. ‘Vagueness’ or ‘fuzziness’ shall here be understood as the lack of clearly
defined boundaries of a linguistic expression, and the presence of borderline
cases.1 Representative examples are the vague predicates ‘red’, ‘bald’, and ‘tall’.
Vague predicates can give rise to a Sorites paradox:2 given a first red object an
that clearly has the predicate R, in a series of implicative sentences starting from
Ran, one is inclined to infer Ran+1 for an object that is only a little less red,
but clearly ¬Ran+i for some large i. So each separate premise of this argument
taken separately is true, but the conclusion turns out to be false:
? Fellow of the FWO - Research Foundation Flanders.
1 See e.g. [15], [11].
2 The Sorites paradox is a very ancient problem that has multiple instances and several
formulations, and a few possible solutions. For an overview, see [5].
Ran,
and if Ran then Ran+1,
and if Ran+1 then Ran+2,
...
and if Ran+i−1 then Ran+i
Ran+i
A similar phenomenon appears to occur in expressions that use certain index-
icals. Notable research in indexicality has been done by Kaplan [7]. Indexicals
are linguistic expressions whose referent can be different in every context. Ka-
plan’s standard list of indexicals includes the personal pronouns ‘I’, ‘my’, ‘you’,
‘he’, ‘his’, ‘she’ and ‘it’, the demonstrative pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’, the ad-
verbs ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘tomorrow’, and ‘yesterday’, and the adjectives ‘actual’ and
‘present’ ([7], p. 489). Indexicals are said to be ‘vague’ in case they have a vague
reference, namely if the boundaries of what they refer to are not clearly deter-
mined.
Not all indexicals can have a vague reference, hence a classification regarding
the vagueness of indexicals should be drawn here. In the ordinary use, the index-
icals that are personal or demonstrative pronouns do not have a vague reference,
because they refer to a person or an object that has clearly defined boundaries
in the real world. Also, the adverbs ‘tomorrow’ and ‘yesterday’ generally do not
have a vague reference, because the boundaries of the days they refer to are
conventionally determined.3 The adverbs ‘here’ and ‘now’, on the contrary, may
have a vague reference. Analogous to the above formal argument, a series of
implicative sentences in which the reference of these vague indexicals changes
every time by a small step, can add up to a Sorites paradox. Let us clarify this
with an example. When a speaker uses the vague indexical ‘here’ to refer to his
own location, the reference is not vague, and it is completely true that he is e.g.
‘standing here’. But the reference turns out to be vague when the speaker refers
to the persons standing in a line next to him, starting with the closest one and
proceeding with those standing further and further away from him:4
I am standing here,
and if I am standing here, then Tom is too,
and if Tom is standing here, then Sally is too,
...
and then personi is too.
3 One might notice here that this does not account for idiomatic expressions. For
example, saying that ‘yesterday’s dreams are gone’ is the same as saying that ‘the
dreams of the past are gone’.
4 This is an example from [2], by which it is shown - contra [12] - that the indexical
‘here’ can admit of varied interpretation in verb phrase ellipsis. Verb phrase ellipsis,
by allowing to recover the meaning of both the omitted verb phrase and the indexical,
is here used to express reference shifting of the latter.
Throughout the series, a shift occurs between the use of the indexical ‘here’
and the point where the indexical ‘here’ can no longer be applied. An analogous
reasoning can be constructed with the indexical ‘now’. For example, when one
throws down a row of domino blocks, and uses the indexical ‘now’ to refer to
the moment of falling down of the dominos. When one pushes the first domino
and says ‘the first domino is falling now’, this is completely true. But put into a
series of implicative sentences, ‘now’ becomes vague:
The first domino is falling now,
and if the first domino is falling now, then the second is too,
and if the second domino is falling now, then the third is too,
...
and then dominoi is too.
‘Now’ is often assumed to refer to the very moment of the utterance. In the
first sentence, this is indeed the case, so there the reference is not vague. But
in successive uses, where ‘now’ refers each time to distinct but almost indistin-
guishable moments (n and n+ 1), its reference becomes vague. When a series of
such implicative sentences is constructed, a paradox arises.
Note that in the above cases, a gradual shift of reference is at hand, and
not an extension of reference. That is, the reference of ‘here’ or ‘now’ can also
gradually change in a series of sentences in which one reference always includes
the previous reference. For example, when the speaker uses the indexical ‘here’
to refer to his own location and that of the first person close to him, and then to
refer to his own location and that of the two persons closest to him, et cetera.
This reasoning does not add up to a paradox.5
Our approach does not contradict Kaplan’s ‘Direct Reference’ view of in-
dexicals, but nuances it. Following [7], the ‘character’ of an indexical fixes its
reference in certain a context. So the character is a rule that determines its cor-
rect application. We agree with Kaplan that, for instance, the character of ‘here’
makes sure that the indexical refers to the location of the speaker. But we argue
to take this case as the default, and want to show how ‘here’ can also have a
vague behaviour in certain cases.
This still leaves the adjectives ‘actual’ and ‘present’ from Kaplan’s standard
list. ‘Actual’ and ‘present’ differ from ‘here’ and ‘now’ as their reference is typi-
cally vague: one can not precisely pinpoint the boundaries of the period of time
that these indexicals refer to. In this sense, the indexicals ‘actual’ and ‘present’
behave like locative terms as ‘close, ‘below’, et cetera, which are also generally
subject to vagueness. It is possible to construct a Sorites series with ‘actual’ or
‘present’, or with a vague spatial term. But since the indexical or spatial term is
5 Compare this to [9], where a distinction is made between ‘now’ and ‘here’ as ‘auto-
matic’ indexicals (referring to respectively the time and place of the utterance) and
as ‘discretionary’ indexicals (referring to an interval of time or a region of space,
that contains respectively the time and place of the utterance, and of which the size
depends on the speaker’s intention).
fuzzy by itself, the reference is vague in each expression of the series, and nothing
special is at hand here.6
In our approach, the vague reference of indexicals will be addressed by means
of adaptive fuzzy logics. We develop upon the adaptive fuzzy logics for vague
predicates presented in [14]. Adaptive fuzzy logics are an optimal tool to explicate
the reasoning process instantiated by a Sorites paradox. Instead of limiting valid
repeated applications of Modus Ponens, in an adaptive fuzzy logic one uses
classical logic until fuzziness-related problems arise. One allows for the local
failing of Modus Ponens applications for expressions that turn out to be fuzzy,
and for unrestricted Modus Ponens applications for expressions that turn out
to be non-fuzzy. In our logic, an indexical will be formally represented by a
modifier in the language, varying on the notion of modifier as a function that
maps from properties to properties (see the notion of ‘property modification’
[8]): an indexical m is applied to atomic formulas pia, where pi is a unary, either
non-vague or vague predicate, and a is an individual constant.
Indexicals have previously been treated as modifiers. A well-know treatment
of ‘now’ as a temporal modifier is in [6], where it is shown that ‘now’ does not
always occur ‘vacuously’ (i.e. does not always refer to the moment of utterance)
in the scope of another temporal modifier, as in ‘I learned last week that there
would now be an earthquake’ ([6], p. 229).7 We agree with Kamp that ‘now’ is
not vacuous in the scope of another temporal modifier, and that it can be said to
be vacuous in a sentence like ‘it is (now) raining’; but we do not agree with his
assumption that ‘now’ always refers to the moment of utterance. It is precisely
our goal to show how the reference of ‘now’ can deviate from this default since
it can be vague, and that a similar approach accounts for ‘here’.
We proceed as follows. First we will set out the standard format, the proof
theory, and the semantics of adaptive logics. In section 3, we will present four
adaptive fuzzy logics for indexicals generating (possibly) fuzzy predications. Sim-
ilarly, in section 4 we will use adaptive fuzzy logics to address indexicals applied
6 Note that indexicals belong to another word category than spatial terms, in that
they are speaker-dependent (the reference of ‘here’ is determined by the location of
the speaker, while the reference of ‘close’ is not) and in that they do not ask for an
object (‘here’ is clear in itself, while ‘close’ is a relative term). Also, some expressions
containing an indexical are always true and the indexical can be omitted, e.g. ‘I am
here’ and ‘we live now’ (no matter the utterer and the time and place of utterance).
The indexicals can then said to be ‘vacuous’ or ‘redundant’ (cf. [13], [6]). This does
not hold for relative terms.
7 This example shows the need for a twofold approach for the interpretation of ‘now’:
the indexical is determined by one invariant feature (the context of utterance) and
one variant feature (shifted by modal operators), so the Montagovian ‘index’ (rep-
resenting the context of use) is needed twice. See the notion of ‘double-indexing’ in
[7]: one indexical is related to both the context of utterance and the circumstance of
evaluation. The example of a Sorites paradox with ‘here’ from [2] introduced above,
is shown to bear a structural resemblance with the idea of ‘double-indexing’ in [3]:
the content of ‘here’ is determined by both the invariant location of the speaker and
its shifting elided occurrences.
to (possibly) vague predicates. In the conclusion we will mention further research
issues.
2 Adaptive Fuzzy Logic
2.1 Standard Format
Definition 1. An adaptive logic (AL) consists of the following elements:
1. A lower limit logic (LLL): a monotonic, reflexive, transitive and compact
logic which has a characteristic semantics (with no trivial models).
2. A set of abnormalities: a set of formulas Ω characterised by a (possibly
restricted) logical form that is LLL-contingent and contains at least one
logical symbol.
3. A strategy: the strategy determines how to cope with conditional derivations
given a set of derived abnormalities. The most important strategies are Re-
liability and Minimal Abnormality.
The standard format ensures soundness and completeness, and other important
meta-theoretical properties. Many of these can be found in [1].
2.2 Proof Theory
The adaptive proof theory consists of a set of inference rules (determined by the
LLL and the set of abnormalities Ω) and a marking definition (determined by
the set of abnormalities Ω and the chosen strategy). An AL-proof is a chain of
stages composed by lines in which for each two subsequent stages it holds that
the first is an extension of the second. In an annotated AL-proof, a line consists
of five elements: (1) a line number i, (2) a formula A, (3) a justification rule, (4)
a condition consisting of a set of abnormalities Θ ⊂ Ω, and (5) a √ or nothing
when the line is marked respectively unmarked. A Dab-formula Dab(Υ ) is the
disjunction of the members of a finite Υ ⊂ Ω. In an adaptive proof, three types
of generic rules are used:
PREM If A ∈ Γ . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If {A1, . . . , An} `LLL B A1 Υ1
. . . . . .
An Υn
B Υ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Υn
RC If {A1, . . . , An} `LLL B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 Υ1
. . . . . .
An Υn
B Υ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Υn ∪Θ
The rule RU is used in case of an unconditional derivation. The rule RC, mean-
while, is used in case B is derived from A1, ..., An on the condition Θ.
Definition 2 (Marking definition for Reliability).
Where Υ is the condition of line i, line i is marked at stage s if and only if
Υ ∩ Us(Γ ) 6= ∅.
Definition 3 (Marking definition for Minimal Abnormality).
Where A is the formula and Υ is the condition of line i, line i is marked at stage
s if and only if
1. there is no ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ ) such that ϕ ∩ Υ = ∅, or
2. for some ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ ), there is no line at which A is derived on a condition Θ
for which ϕ ∩Θ = ∅.
Following the Minimal Abnormality Strategy, the models are selected that verify
as little abnormalities as possible. Following the Reliability Strategy, one falsifies
any instance of abnormal formulas.
2.3 Semantics
Semantically, an AL selects the LLL-models of the premises that are as normal
as possible. What ‘as normal as possible’ means, depends on the chosen strategy.
We define the following:
Definition 4. Dab(Υ ) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ if and only if Γ LLL
Dab(Υ ) and, for all Υ ′ ⊂ Υ , Γ 2LLL Dab(Υ ′).
Definition 5. Where Dab(Υ1), Dab(Υ2), . . . are the minimal Dab-consequences
of Γ , let U(Γ ) =df Υ1 ∪ Υ2 ∪ . . .
Definition 6. Where M is an LLL-model, Ab(M) =df {A ∈ Ω |M |= A}.
Definition 7. A LLL-model M of Γ is a reliable model if Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ ).
Definition 8. A is a reliable semantic consequence of Γ , in symbols Γ ALr A,
if all reliable models of Γ verify A.
Definition 9. A LLL-model M of Γ is a minimally abnormal model if there
is no LLL-model M ′ of Γ for which Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 10. A is a minimal abnormal semantic consequence of Γ , in symbols
Γ ALm A, if all minimally abnormal models of Γ verify A.
3 Vague Indexicals and Non-vague Predicates
3.1 LLL: The Fuzzy LogicM Ln
The logic  Ln used in [14] is the standard  Lukasiewicz fuzzy logic  L with a lower
acceptability threshold. The fuzzy logicM Ln extends the language of  Ln with a
modifier and forms the LLL of the adaptive fuzzy logics that we will define. In the
examples of a Sorites paradox with a vague indexical given in section 1, the ex-
pressions are of the form (Here(Standing(Tom))) and (Now(Falling(Dominon))).
They contain three elements: an element in the domain (formally represented by
a constant), a proper non-vague predicate, and a vague indexical. It is assumed
that an expression pian has a crisp truth value.
8 ‘Standing here’ or ‘falling now’
should not be understood as an atomic predicate, because this would forbid one
to explain the logical and semantical behaviour of the indexical ‘here’ or ‘now’
taken alone. The predication pia for (Standing(Tom)) or (Falling(Dominon))
has the same evaluation throughout the Sorites series. But when the modifier
‘here’ or ‘now’ is applied, the formula m[pian] may map to a fuzzy truth value.
In sum, ‘standing’ or ‘falling’ is treated as a non-vague predicate applied to
constants (individuals or objects), and ‘here’ or ‘now’ as a separate operator,
namely a function that maps a non-vague predicate to a (possibly fuzzy) appli-
cation of it. In this way, the conditional steps in the Sorites series are formalised
as: m[pian] → m[pian+1]. The validity of such a conditional is preserved even
for cases where the consequent is a little less true than the antecedent, up to a
difference that is established by the threshold.
The language schema of the LLL is defined as in [14], except that the set
of unary predicate symbols P = {P,Q,R} consists only of non-vague predicates
for this version of the adaptive logic. Let the finite set of constant symbols be
C = {a1, a2, . . .}, and the set of variable symbols be V = {x, y, z}. The language
F of open and closed formulas consists of atomic formulas piα, where pi ∈ P and
α ∈ C ∪V, and is closed under the unary connectives and operators ¬, ∆, and F,
∼i (i ∈ N), the binary connectives &, ∧, ∨, →, and Y and the quantifiers ∀ and
∃ in the standard first-order way. The set of closed formulas W is also defined
in the usual way. The connectives are defined as follows (A and B are used as
metavariables for predicative formulas of the from pia) :
(D1) A YB =df ¬A→ B
(D2) A&B =df ¬(¬A Y ¬B)
(D3) A ∧B =df A&(A→ B)
(D4) A ∨B =df ((A→ B)→ B)&((B → A)→ A)
(D5) ∼i A =df ¬∆(A YAi), where i ∈ N
(D6) FA =df ¬∆¬A ∧ ¬∆A.
(D7) ∀αA(α) =df
∧{A(α)|α ∈ C}
(D8) ∃αA =df ¬∀α¬A
3.2 Axiomatisation
For the proof theory, we start by axiomatising the logic  L, for which the Rose-
Rosser axioms are used [10] (corresponding to some CL-axioms):9
8 Crispness is the opposite of vagueness. While a vague expression has a truth value
lying between 0 and 1, a crisp expression has either the truth value 0 or 1.
9 Notice that this corresponds to the set of axioms valid for all non-modified formulas
in the LLL M L.
(A1) (A→ B)→ ((B → C)→ (A→ C))
(A2) A→ (B → A)
(A3) ((A→ B)→ B)→ ((B → A)→ A)
(A4) (¬A→ ¬B)→ (B → A)
We define a set of extra axioms in order to fix the meaning of the Baaz’ ∆-
operator (cf. [4]) that can be intuitively read as ‘it is completely true that’ (and
behaves axiomatically as a -operator):
(A∆1) ∆A ∨ ¬∆A
(A∆2) ∆(A ∨B)→ (∆A ∨∆B)
(A∆3) ∆A→ A
(A∆4) ∆A→ ∆∆A
(A∆5) ∆(A→ B)→ (∆A→ ∆B)
The following axioms define how the modified formulas with a non-vague predi-
cate behave proof-theoretically:
(A1) A→ mA
(A2) m[A ∨B]→ (m[A] ∨m[B])
The first axiom corresponds to a possibility or local version of Axiom T : it says
that for any true formula, there is at least one application of the modifier that
is true for it. The second axiom allows distribution over disjunction: if for some
application of the modifier a true disjunction holds, at any of the disjuncts the
application must be true. Finally, the rules of  L are:
(MP) From A and A→ B derive B
(NEC) From A derive ∆A
Modus Ponens and the necessitation rule are valid in  L. As we will see, unre-
stricted applications of these rules in M L are problematic and for this reason,
the adaptive strategies on M L with a prefixed acceptability threshold will be
deployed.
3.3 Semantics
A M L-model is a pair M = 〈D, v〉 whenever the domain D is a finite set of the
same cardinality as the finite set of constant symbols C; v maps the constants to
the elements of D and the modified predicates to possibly fuzzy subsets of D:
(i) v : C 7→ D is a one-to-one mapping
(ii) v : P 7→ (D 7→ {0, 1})
(iii) v : M 7→ (P 7→ (D 7→ [0, 1]))
where M = {m}. So the non-modified formula has a truth value of either 0 or
1, i.e. is not fuzzy. And the modified formula has a truth value between 0 and 1,
including 0 and 1, i.e. is possibly fuzzy. The valuation function vM : W 7→ [0, 1],
determined by M, is defined by the following conditions:
(S1) vM (piα) = v(pi)〈v(α)〉
(S2) vM (A→ B) = min(1, (1− vM (A)) + vM (B))
(S3) vM (¬A) = 1− vM (A)
(S4) vM (∆A) = 1 if vM (A) = 1 and vM (∆A) = 0 if vM (A) 6= 1
(S5) vM (m[A]) = 0 if vM (A) = 0, vM (m[A]) = 1 if vM (∆A) = 1,
and vM (m[A]) ∈ ]0, 1[ otherwise
where → stands for the classical implication, and ∆ enables one to express non-
fuzzy applications of the modified formulas. Intuitively, the fifth condition states
that e.g. if someone is not ‘standing’, then he is not ‘standing here’. And if it
is completely true that he is ‘standing’, then there is a value of ‘here’ for which
it is true that he is ‘standing here’. And in all other cases, ‘standing here’ has
a fuzzy evaluation. Semantic evaluations for the other operators can be defined
accordingly, as e.g.: vM (Fm[A]) = 1 if vM (m[A]) =]0, 1[ and vM (Fm[A]) = 0
otherwise.
3.4 Designated Values and Acceptability Threshold
In  L the only designated value is 1. However, it is more natural to use an interval
of designated values [ nn+1 , 1], for some natural number n > 1. We call
n
n+1 the
acceptability threshold as it is the threshold for determining whether a formula
is true enough, i.e. acceptable, or not. Let n be such a number. The logic M Ln
has the same language, the same models and the same truth-functionality for
the connectives as M L. Obviously, M Ln defines another semantic consequence
relation (cf. [14], p. 1878):10
Definition 12. A formula A is a semantic consequence of Γ in M Ln, in sym-
bols Γ M Ln A, if vM (A) ∈ [ nn+1 , 1] for every model M in which vM (B) ∈
[ nn+1 , 1] for every B ∈ Γ .
10 The resulting systems are not axiomatisable in the strict sense, because there are
obviously applications of Modus Ponens that are no longer valid. In ([14], p. 1878)
a special translation trn from  Ln to  L is proposed:
Definition 11. trn(Γ  Ln A) =df {B YB
n|B ∈ Γ}  L A YAn
It says that if a formula A is a semantic consequence in  Ln of a set of premises Γ ,
then ¬A→ An is a consequence of ¬B → Bn for every B ∈ Γ . Hence, if the formula
is invalid in general, then one can make it valid at the given acceptability threshold
n. The translation allows to define a proof theory for  Ln in view of the following
theorem
Theorem 1. Γ  Ln A if and only if trn(Γ  Ln A)
which is immediately valid for formulas preceded by ∆. The translation can be
adapted to M Ln, which is a suitable LLL: it is monotonic, reflexive, transitive as
well as compact, and the connectives ∼n and ∨ have a CL-meaning.
3.5 Strategies and Abnormalities
The acceptability threshold determines which applications of the Modus Ponens
rule are not valid, but generate abnormalities, such that for some ai, ¬∆m[piai]
and ¬∆¬m[piai]. By selecting an appropriate Strategy (Reliability or Minimal
Abnormality), one proceeds in the semantics by selecting the models that either
eliminate all the abnormal cases, or precisely identify which abnormality is valid,
hence indicate the shift point between crisp evaluations; in the proof theory one
proceeds by establishing which derivable formulas are finally retained.
There are two options to conceive of the vagueness of an indexical. These
two ways are reflected by the two sets of abnormalities defined in [14] that we
here adapt to conceive of the fuzziness of the modifier:
– The first option states that a modifier should be interpreted as abnormal
when there is at least one application of the modifier that turns out to be
fuzzy. That is, suppose we have expressions of the form m[piai]. For some
i = {1 . . . n− 1} the expression is not fuzzy, in other words ∆m[piai]. Also,
for some j = {n+ 1 . . . n+m} the expression is not fuzzy, i.e. ∆¬m[piaj ].
But for some intermediary m[pian], the application becomes fuzzy. When
i may be interpreted as normal, i.e. bivalent, classical logic (CL) remains
the way to go. This first option holds for the logics M Lmgn and M Lrgn . In
these two logics the set of abnormalities is the same. Let ∃(A) denote the
existential closure of A and Ω the set of abnormalities. Then the set Ω is
defined as follows.
Ωg = {(∃α)Fm[piα]|m ∈M;pi ∈ P;α ∈ V} (1)
Read in an informal way, the abnormalities of the Soritical argument express
that:
1. There is a (set of) personn, standing in the group of people around the
speaker, for whom it is both not completely true that he is standing not
here, and not completely true that he is standing here.
2. There is a (set of) dominon, with n > 1, for which it is both not com-
pletely true that it is falling not now, and not completely true that it is
falling now.
– According to the second option to conceive of the fuzziness of the modifier,
individual applications of the modifier m may be (ab)normal. This implies
that in some cases m[piai] would be fuzzy, while in other cases it might not
be, and it leads to a more fine-grained solution. So for some application to a
given individual, the intended meaning of ‘here’ is preserved, while in other
applications, it is no longer valid. This second option holds for the logics
M Lmln and M Lrln , and results in a different set of abnormalities:
Ωl = {∃(Fm[piα])|m ∈M;pi ∈ P;α ∈ V ∪ C} (2)
Read in an informal way, these abnormalities express that:
1. Individual applications of ‘here’ may turn out to be abnormal. Hence,
for some persons, ‘standing here’ is completely true at some stage and
completely not true at some other stage.
2. Individual applications of ‘now’ may turn out to be abnormal. Hence,
for some dominos, ‘falling now’ may be completely true at some stage
and completely not true at some other stage.
Hence, we conclude by formulating the four logics: M Lmgn = M Ln + Ωg +
Minimal Abnormality; M Lrgn = M Ln + Ωg + Reliability; M Lmln = M Ln +
Ωl +Minimal Abnormality; M Lrln =M Ln +Ωl +Reliability.
3.6 Example
We now present a concrete example of an adaptive proof for 10 instances of pian.
The premises (which are derived on the empty condition) are the following:
1 ∆m[pia1] PREM ∅
2 ∆¬m[pia10] PREM ∅
3.1 m[pia1]→ m[pia2] PREM ∅
3.2 m[pia2]→ m[pia3] PREM ∅
...
3.9 m[pia9]→ m[pia10] PREM ∅
4.1 ∆(m[pia2]→ m[pia1]) PREM ∅
4.2 ∆(m[pia3]→ m[pia2]) PREM ∅
...
4.9 ∆(m[pia10]→ m[pia9]) PREM ∅
The first premise states that the modified predicate completely holds for a1, and
the second that it is completely false for a10. Premises 3.1 to 3.9 express the
conditional steps: if the modified predicate holds for a given constant, it will
hold for the next one (strict preservation upwards). Premises 4.1 to 4.9 state
that at each stage, indexicality is fully preserved downwards (formally: for all i,
vM (m[piai+1]) ≤ vM (m[piai])).
5.1 m[pia2] 1,3.1 RU ∅
5.2 m[pia3] 5.1, 3.2; RC {Fm[pia2]}
...
5.9 m[pia10] 5.8, 3.9; RC {Fm[piai] | i ∈ [2, 9]}
6 m[pia10] ∧ ¬m[pia10] 5.9, 2; RU {Fm[piai] | i ∈ [2, 9]}
6’ m[pia10] ∧ ¬m[pia10]∨{Fm[piai] | i ∈ [2, 9]} 1–4.9; RU ∅
7
∨{Fm[piai] | i ∈ [2, 9]} 6’; RU ∅
At line 5.1, it is unconditionally derived that the modified predicate holds for
a2. At line 5.2, we establish that m[pia3] holds given: the content of line 5.1, the
implication m[pia2]→ m[pia3] derived at line 3.2, and the condition that a2 does
not behave abnormally, namely that it is not the case that both ¬∆m[pia2] and
¬∆¬m[pia2]. The same inference can be performed for every pia4−10, where at
each stage an additional abnormality is required to be false. At line 6, we derive a
contradiction from lines 2 and 5.9, preserving the condition that no abnormality
is valid at any of the previous stages. At line 7, we use the mechanism that is
known as Dab intro-shortcut : if a contradiction A is derived on a condition Θ
on some line i, then
∨
Θ may be unconditionally derived from the premise set
on line i+ 1. From this moment on, the proofs of M Lmgn and M Lrgn on the one
hand, and of M Lmln and M Lrln on the other, proceed differently.
M Lmgn andM Lrgn . Since a contradiction is conditionally derived at line 6, we
know that the modifier m cannot be a crisp modifier: line 7 says that at least
one abnormality is derivable. Given the marking definitions (see Definitions 2
and 3), all conditional lines in the proof should be marked. Only fuzzy logic can
be applied here, and thus the  Lmgn - and  L
rg
n -consequences are exactly the same
as the M Ln-consequences.
5.1 m[pia2] 1, 3.1 RU ∅
5.2 m[pia3] 5.1, 3.2; RC {∃x(FPx)} √
. . .
5.9 m[pia10] 5.8, 3.9; RC {∃x(FPx)} √
6 m[pia10] ∧ ¬m[pia10] 5.9, 2; RU {∃x(FPx)} √
7 {∃x(Fm[pix])} 1–4.9; RU ∅
In this case, the modifier is fuzzy as a whole.
M Lmln andM Lrln . Let us consider the logicsM Lml2 andM Lrl2 .11 By accumu-
lating conditions, we can derive m[pia10] on line 5.9, but this is in contradiction
with line 2. Using the Dab intro-shortcut,
∨{Fm[piai] | i ∈ [2, 9]} is uncondi-
tionally derived from the premise set on line 7. This formula states that one
m[piai], where i ∈ [2, 9], should be fuzzy. The strategy (together with our chosen
threshold) will allow us to resolve the impasse, leading to the marking of several
lines. Because of the space limitations, we will only set out part of the proof
here.12 First one derives all the possible sets of pairs that violate the Sorites-like
inference steps.
11.1
∨{Fm[pia2],Fm[pia4],Fm[pia6],Fm[pia8]} 10; RU ∅
11.2
∨{Fm[pia3],Fm[pia4],Fm[pia6],Fm[pia8]} 10; RU ∅
11.3
∨{Fm[pia3],Fm[pia5],Fm[pia7],Fm[pia8]} 10; RU ∅
11.4
∨{Fm[pia3],Fm[pia5],Fm[pia7],Fm[pia9]} 10; RU ∅
11.5
∨{Fm[pia3],Fm[pia5],Fm[pia6],Fm[pia8]} 10; RU ∅
11 These logics have the threshold 2
3
. Accordingly, Modus Ponens is only conditionally
applicable: the truth-degree of the ‘hereness’ of two adjacent persons or the ‘nowness’
of two adjacent dominos can differ at most by 1
3
if the implication is valid from one
to the other.
12 Accordingly, line numbers will not be consecutive.
11.1-11.5 are the minimal Dab-consequences for the premise set. Following the
Minimal Abnormality Strategy (Definition 3), one selects the least necessary
number of such abnormal formulas (excluding those sets where the difference
between elements is above the threshold, e.g. {Fm[pia3],Fm[pia6]}): Φs(Γ ) =
{{Fm[pia2],Fm[pia3]}, {Fm[pia3],Fm[pia4]}, {Fm[pia4],Fm[pia5]}, {Fm[pia5],
Fm[pia6]}, {Fm[pia6],Fm[pia7]}, {Fm[pia7],Fm[pia8]}, {Fm[pia8],Fm[pia9]}. Keep-
ing deriving formulas on conditions, one marks all those lines whose condition has
a non-empty intersection with one of such minimal disjunction of abnormalities.
As an example:
14.2 ¬Fm[pia5] ∨ ¬Fm[pia6] 14.1; RC {Fm[pia5]} √
15.2 ¬Fm[pia5] ∨ ¬Fm[pia6] 15.1; RC {Fm[pia6]} √
Eventually, the only derivable content that does not get marked will be (m[pia4]∨
¬m[pia4]) ∧ (m[pia3] ∨ ¬m[pia3]):
26 (m[pia4] ∨ ¬m[pia4])∧
(m[pia3] ∨ ¬m[pia3]) 23; RU {Fm[pia2],Fm[pia3]}
27 (m[pia4] ∨ ¬m[pia4])∧
(m[pia3] ∨ ¬m[pia3]) 24; RU {Fm[pia9],Fm[pia8],Fm[pia7],Fm[pia6]
m[pia5],m[pia2]}
28 (m[pia4] ∨ ¬m[pia4])∧
(m[pia3] ∨ ¬m[pia3]) 25; RU {Fm[pia9],Fm[pia8],Fm[pia7],Fm[pia6]
m[pia5],m[pia4]}
This will be finally derived from the premises. So either m[pi] or ¬m[pi] holds for
both a3 and a4. This value identifies therefore where the shift in the applicability
of the indexical occurs. Applying the Reliability Strategy will induce a marking
on every conditional line; hence, the consequence set will again correspond to
that of M L2.
4 Indexicals and Vague Predicates
In [14], the setting was said to resolve the Sorites paradox with vague pred-
icates. We can also give an interpretation of expressions where the predicate
is vague and applying the indexical makes as many as possible of those pred-
ications crisp. Expressions considered are of the form (Here(Steep(Hill))) and
(Now(Healthy(David))). Let us again clarify this with an example. Suppose you
are at the top of a steep hill (hill1), the steepness of which decreases gradually:
The hill1 is steep,
and if the hill1 is steep, then the hill2 is too,
and if the hill2 is steep, then the hill3 is too,
...
and then the hilln is too.
While the hill is clearly steep for some small n, there is some value of n for
which ‘steep’ is vague, and the hill is clearly not steep for some large n, since
you have then reached its bottom.13 In the derivation in section 3, we generated
cases where the predications are vague. We can use the same machinery to
disambiguate a vague predicate by identifying the point at which the shift occurs
and the predicate becomes crisp. This approach reverses the previous format: the
non-modified formula (may) have a vague behaviour, and the modified formula
turns out to be crisp in most cases. So the non-modified formula fits into a Sorites
paradox, but the modified formula does not. We return to the original setting
of [14] where predicates are vague, and we use a modifier that takes the crisp
values {0,1} for bunches of fuzzy values of such predicates. We take the fuzzy
logic M Ln with the appropriate changes as our LLL. The designated values
and acceptability threshold, and the strategies and abnormalities are defined as
before.
4.1 Axiomatisation
(A1) pian → m[pian]
(A2) m[pian] ∨ ¬m[pian]
(A3) m[pian ∨ pian+i]→ (m[pian] ∨m[pian+i])
(A4) m[pian → pian+i]→ (m[pian]→ m[pian+i])
(A1) and (A3) correspond to the axioms above. Since the modified formula with
a vague predicate has a crisp truth value, (A2) and (A4) also hold.
4.2 Semantics
The semantics of this version of the adaptive fuzzy logic is different from the one
above, because the function v now maps predicates to elements in a domain, to
truth values in a fuzzy domain, and it maps a modifier to predicates to elements
in a domain, to truth values in a non-fuzzy domain:
(i) v : C 7→ D is a one-to-one mapping
(ii) v : P 7→ (D 7→ [0, 1])
(iii) v : M 7→ (P 7→ (D 7→ {0, 1}))
The valuation function vM is defined by conditions S1-S4 as above, but S5 differs:
(S5) vM (m[A]) = 0 if vM (A) ∈ [0, 1[ and vM (m[A]) = 1 if vM (A) ∈ ]0, 1]
13 The indexical ‘here’ attaches to an identified point (possibly detached from the
location of the speaker). Similarly, a series of predications with ‘now’ identifies points
in time (not necessarily corresponding to moments of utterance).
It states that if the non-modified formula has some value between false (included)
and true (excluded), then the modified formula is false. And if the non-modified
formula has some value between false (excluded) and true (included), then the
modified formula is true. Intuitively, this means that the hill is not ‘steep here’
if it is not ‘steep’; and it is ‘steep here’, if it is ‘steep’, both for a large bunch of
values up to some ]n[. At the shift point n between steep and not-steep, the hill is
both ‘steep here’ and not ‘steep here’. So in all the cases before n, the hill is ‘steep
here’. And in all the cases after n, the hill is not ‘steep here’. So vM (piai = [0, n])
induces vM (m[piai]) = 0, and vM (piai = [n, 1]) induces vM (m[piai]) = 1. The
same logics presented above will identify the values of piai that represent the
shift point from m[piai−1] = 0 to m[piai+1] = 1. At point i, there is a truth value
glut (m[piai] evaluates to both 0 and 1).
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced a dynamic logical treatment of vague expressions with
indexicals in a series of implicative sentences. In future research, we hope to
clarify further uses of indexicals in a temporal setting and Sorites-like phenomena
with distinct indexicals or distinct predicates.
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